Koizumi’s post-election China policy?
Simon links to an interesting article by Yoichi Funabashi, an Asahi senior correspondent who’s now a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution. It asks the question about how the LDP’s landslide relates to China from the opposite direction I’ve been asking it–namely, how will Koizumi’s victory play out in Japan’s China policy, and what will that mean as the two countries evolve economically?
Curiously enough, foreign policy was almost totally absent from the pre-election debate. Some may perceive this as a sign that Japan is growing increasingly inward-looking, as Koizumi simply wanted to limit the agenda to the single domestic issue of postal privatization. However, this reading would be wrong. Although very difficult to detect since it was discreetly under the radar, I would nevertheless contend that the China factor was actually one of the largest issues in this election, as more than any other factor, a rising China and its direct challenge to Japan set the context for the debate.
I’m not 100% sure I’m convinced by every jot and tittle that follows, but Funabashi is right in the main. Foreign policy was brought up only by relatively minor opposition parties, and then almost exclusively with reference to the SDF deployment in Iraq and the proposed revisions to the Japanese constitution. Not even specific policy issues that were the subjects of recent flare-ups–such as the disputed fossil fuel fields in the East China Sea–were given attention, let alone the larger question of how Japan intends to maintain its strategic role in a shifting Asia.
One part I’m not sure about–not that I disagree, mark you; I just think it could go either way–is this:
Koizumi’s landslide victory may in time prove to be the last gasp of the LDP, as the public likely holds unrealistic expectations of how much Koizumi will be able to accomplish before he steps down next September.
Given their shocked reactions to their own party’s staggering victory, that was on minds of quite a few LDP members themselves right after the election, too. I wonder, though. Japan is a conformist society, but the Japanese have personal idiosyncrasies like everyone else. Just about everyone here has had multiple experiences with, say, projects at work that failed because protocol and consensus-building were prioritized over practical decision-making. I think it very possible that Koizumi is clever enough to find a way to blame any further stalling of reforms over the next year on, if not hold-outs in the House of Councillors, then federal bureaucrats. In that case, it could be his successor who’s in big trouble and will need to get used to doing a Margaret Thatcher impression.
Funabashi doesn’t put it this way, but he does by extension raise another very disturbing question: Is it even possible for Japan to fashion a really workable comprehensive China policy, or have conditions gotten to the point that protecting Japan’s interests will mean constantly shifting in response to this week’s constellation of trade and cultural conflicts? Remember that you have to factor in (something else Funabashi doesn’t weigh) that the US and Japan have become even closer military allies over the last several years. The possibilities are endless. It will be very interesting to see what Koizumi does with his momentum over these next few weeks when the sugar high is over.